Gallipoli: The End of the Myth

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY

  Takes us step by step through the campaign that cost the Allies casualties of 390,000, including some 30,000 Australian and New Zealand troops. Evaluating the strategy, the commanders, and the performance of individual soldiers on the ground, Prior’s conclusions are hard-hitting and painful. The naval campaign was not ‘almost’ won by the allies, but decisively lost. The land action was not bedevilled by minor misfortunes, but devastated by fatal miscalculation and error. Even if victorious, the campaign would not have shortened the war by a single day nor was the downfall of Turkey of any relevance to the global objectives of World War One. The Gallipoli campaign was a bad war, misjudged, poorly thought through, and despite their bravery the allied troops died in vain. This devastating critique of the Gallipoli campaign should mark the end of many lingering questions about the event, and shatter the persistent belief in the ‘romance of war’.

• xvi, 288 p., [16] p. : ill., maps. ; 24 cm. #050224
• First published by Yale University Press, 2009.
• World War, 1914-1918 — Campaigns — Turkey — Gallipoli Peninsula
• World War, 1914-1918 — Campaigns — Turkey — Gallipoli Peninsula — Public opinion
• Combined operations (Military science)
• Gallipoli Peninsula (Turkey) — Strategic aspects